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ABSTRACT 
Although competition policy is an important area for accounting research, contributionsfvom manage- 
ment accountants are lacking. This article aims to show that management accountants can help clarih 
U number of issues in competition policy usingdiagnostic tools such as analytical constructs and concepts 
of cost to establish relevant facts and cost. Accordingly, this article demonstrates that the employment of 
such diagnostic tools can give insights into anti-competitive behuvioral issues in competition policy, as 
illustrated in the Inverness route case. 
ABSTRAK 
Walaupun polisi persaingan adalah satu bidang penting untuk penyelidikan perakaunan, sumbangan 
daripada akauntan pengurusan adalah kurang memberangsangkan. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk 
menunjukkan akauntan pengurusan boleh membantu rnenjelaskan isu-isu dalam polisi persaingan 
dengan menggunakan alat diagnostik seperti konstruk analitikal dan konsep kos untuk rnengemukakan 
fakta yang releven dan kos. Seterusnya artikel ini menunjukhn penggunaan alat diagnostik boleh 
memberikan p m h a m a n  ke atas isu-isu kelakuan anti persaingan seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam kes 
penerbanga n Inverness . 
\ 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a belief that economic competition is 
a good thing, and in countries where the 
economy operates based on free-market prin- 
ciples, '. . . the commitment to competitive 
markets is rarely questioned, although the 
pervasive pro-competition rhetoric is of ten 
more of an aspiration rather than a reality' 
(Cini & McGowan, 1998, p. 2). However, com- 
petition causes uncertainty. To make the fu- 
ture more predictable, firms employ anti- 
competitive strategies. To counter these, com- 
petition policies are thus developed to pre- 
vent, persuade and deter firms from deploy- 
ing those strategies. The establishment of 
competition policies allows for the develop- 
ment of a regulatory framework within which 
governments can maintain and encourage 
competition. 
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Lawyers and economists have shown 
much interest in the competition policy area, 
as seen from their contributions. However, 
management accountants have shown very 
little interest. Bromwich & Hong (2000, p. 161) 
remark that management accountants need to 
become more involved in competition policy 
debates as: 
... accounting for regulated indus- 
tries is an important area for account- 
ing research. Regulation raises many 
important and difficult accounting 
issues of application more widely but 
which seem to be neglected in the 
general management accounting lit- 
erature. 
For clarity and ease of understanding, 
this article is structured into different sec- 
tions. The first section reviews concepts of 
cost that are used with analytical constructs 
to clarify issues in competition policy. The 
second section discusses the analytical con- 
structs that are relevant to the analysis of the 
case. The term 'analytical construct' has been 
invented to describe the 'topics' discussed 
in as linguistically neutral a fashion as pos- 
sible. These analytical constructs can help 
establish which facts are relevant and which 
concepts of cost will shed light on the issues 
in the case. The third section discusses the 
theoretical issues related to the case. The 
fourth section describes the Inverness route 
case. In this section, the importance of 
Heathrow to the economic development of 
Inverness and its surrounding areas is dis- 
cussed. In the fifth section, the diagnostic 
tools (analytical constructs and concepts of 
\ 
cost) are used to clarify issues in the case. 
The conclusion, in the final section, closes 
this article. 
CONCEPTS OF COST 
A good understanding of concepts of cost is 
particularly useful when there are multiple 
ways in which the concepts are used in mana- 
gerial decision processes. Costs are used for 
a variety of purposes, and the same cost data 
that serve very well for one purpose cannot 
be expected to serve equally well for other 
purposes. A failure to recognize this inad- 
equacy has resulted in many apparent differ- 
ences among accountants (see Clark, 1923). 
Concepts of cost are important to man- 
agement accountants because they help to 
measure the cost of a product and are useful in 
decision-making. In the context of this article, 
the cost concepts discussed below help to cast 
light on particular issues in the case. 
COMMON COSTS 
Hawkins (1969, p. 44) provides a definition: 
. . . common costs are incurred when 
products can be separately produced 
with the same or part of the same 
facilities, but need not necessarily be 
produced together. 
Costs may be common to a period of t h e ,  
responsibility, classes of customers and other 
costing units. Common costs contribute to the 
ambiguity of product cost and thereby to the 
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problems of setting prices. Faulhaber (1979) 
demonstrated this in the problem of rate-mak- 
ing for a profit-regulated railroad. A regulated 
railroad that connected two cities also pro- 
vided a service to an intermediate city. The fare 
revenues for passage to and from the interme- 
diate city were more than the additional long- 
run costs of serving that city, but not sufficient 
tocover the allocation of a ’proportionate share’ 
of common cost. The question posed was 
whether the intermediate city was being subsi- 
clued by the cities at each end of the line. 
FULLY-DISTRIBUTED COST 
Fully-Distributed Cost (FDC) is also known as 
fully allocated cost. It is widely used to deter- 
mine a set of prices that normally involve 
historical cost, through the allocation of com- 
mon costs to various outputs. The distribution 
of common costs can be made on a number of 
allocation bases. Within accounting practice, 
there are three popular methods of allocating 
common costs to outputs: direct, step-down 
and reciprocal (Ahmed & Scapens, 1991). Un- 
der the direct method, each service depart- 
ment’s total costs al;e allocated directly to the 
production departments. Under the step-down 
method, the service cost is allocated to user 
departments (both production and service 
departments). The cost allocated to service 
departments is again allocated to user depart- 
ments until the particular service department’s 
costs are fully distributed. It then drops out of 
the allocation process. The process is repeated 
until the costs of the service departments are 
fully distributed to production departments. 
Under the reciprocal method, simultaneous 
equations are used to allocate common costs 
to the production departments. 
The basic defect of FDC is that it does not 
necessarily measure marginal cost responsi- 
bility in a causal sense; ’.. . it is an average cost’ 
(Kahn, 1970, p. 151), and the numerical results 
are highly sensitive to the basis selected for the 
allocation (Baumol et al., 1987). 
INCREMENTAL COST (IC) 
IC can be defined as the increase in cost as a 
result of producing a further output in addi- 
tion to the existing output. Mathematically, 
the IC of product y2 is defined as C(y,, y,) - 
C(YV 0) where C(?) is the total cost function. 
The argument is that the price of product 1 
which exceeds its IC is not ’unfair’ to the 
buyers of product 2 since those buyers gain 
from the sale of product 1 at that price. Baumol 
(1986) considered that the consumers of prod- 
uct 1 are better off by the supply of that prod- 
uct. This is because consumers of the firm’s 
other products must also gain as a group, and 
no consumers lose out in the process. 
The definition of which output is the first 
one for a firm that produces two outputs may 
be of crucial significance because the first out- 
put bears all the c o m o n  costs. The number of 
outputs that have to be considered has no 
h i t ,  and this raises the issue of ordering 
(Heald, 1996). For example, Aumann-Shapley’s 
prices are based on marginal costs averaged 
along a linear path from zero to current pro- 
duction, and Shapley’s prices are based on ICs 
averaged over all possible orderings of out- 
puts (Curien, 1991, p. 82). 
Horngren et al. (1994; 1997) use the IC 
concept to rank individual cost objects and 
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thereby allocate costs according to their 
rankings. The first-ranked cost object (the pri- 
mary user) typically receives cost allocation 
up to its stand-alone cost and the second- 
ranked cost object is allocated the additional 
cost arising from the increase in resource con- 
sumption. If there are more than two second- 
ary users, they will need to be ranked 
sequentially. Under the IC allocation method, 
the primary user receives the highest alloca- 
tion of the common costs. If the first output is 
monopolized, the firm maybe able to establish 
its dominance in adjacent markets because the 
second output receives only additional costs. 
This gives the firm enormous discretion in 
setting prices for its second product. 
AVOIDABLE COST 
Sharkey (1977) exemplifies an avoidable cost 
as a cost that can be avoided by taking a 
particular plant out of production. The cost 
that can be avoided depends only on the total 
capacity of the plant being used, and not on 
the output produced. Baumol (1996) states 
’ that avoidable cost may be thought of as de- 
creasing costto a firm, if it decides to exit the 
industry. In other words, avoidable cost is the 
cost that a firm ‘... can escape or avoid by 
leaving’ (Baumol, 1996, p. 58). Which costs are 
avoidable and their measurement, according 
to Baumol, can be determined only with refer- 
ence to a particular issue or decision. 
Most industries, according to Van Boening 
& Wilcox (1996), seem to exhibit this kind of 
avoidable cost. For example, an electricity 
generating facility is most efficiently operated 
at output close to its capacity. Thus, the asso- 
ciated labor and fuel required to run the facil- 
ity are the avoidable cost. Avoidable cost domi- 
nates an airline’s short-run cost. This is be- 
cause most of the operating costs depend on 
the size of the unit capacity rather than the 
number of passengers carried. 
OPPORTUNITY COST 
The concept of opportunity cost is useful in 
analyzing efficient resource allocation. In a 
perfectly competitive market, the market price 
is always equal to the opportunity cost. This 
can be illustrated in an  open auction called the 
first-price auction. Vickrey (1994) gives an 
example. In a progressive auction, bids for an 
item are freely made and announced. In the 
bidding process, the bids will get closer and 
closer, until no one wishes to put in a higher 
bid for the item. The bidding will stop at a level 
close to the second highest bid. At that point, 
there is only one interested bidder left. Realiz- 
ing this, the ‘surviving’ bidder has only to 
raise the price marginally above the price made 
by the second highest bidder. The opportunity 
cost of the bid is the second highest bid. 
In a closed auction of the form known as 
a second-price auction, its process and out- 
come are similar to the first-price auction; 
Vickrey designed a mechanism that replicates 
the outcome derived from open auction mar- 
kets. The normal practice in calling for a ten- 
der of bids is that the highest or lowest bid, as 
the case may be, will be accepted. According 
to Vickrey, it is advantageous to have the 
’second-price’ method to handle sealed bids 
or closed auctions. Due to asymmetry of infor- 
mation among bidders, errors in evaluation, 











or mistakes in strategy, the result of the 'top- 
price' is non-optimal. The change to the 'sec- 
ond-price' method will yield an increase in the 
aggregate profits to be shared among sellers 
and buyers. 
To prevent a bidder using a 'shill' to push 
the price up by putting a late bid just under the 
top bid, it is desirable to have all bids delivered 
to and certified by a trustworthy holder who 
will then deliver all bids to the seller. Since the 
second-price auction replicates the outcome 
of the first-price auction, the top bidder buys 
the object at a price that corresponds to the 
second highest bid. If the seller is a govern- 
mental body or a large corporation, it is desir- 
able to publish the final terms of sale, to pre- 
vent the agent handling the sale from acting 
against the seller's interest. If this happens, a 
bidder whose bid has been improperly over- 
looked could discover this and lodge a protest. 
Vickrey (1994, p. 68) states that: 
If he were uncertain as to the amount 
of the bid put in by the successful 
bidder, his protest would be moti- 
vated by a hope of being top bidder, 
so that there would be some advan- 
tage at this point &not announcing 
the top bid, but only theeffective price. 
In this auction, the opportunity cost is the 
same as in the first-price auction, that is, sim- 
ply the second highest bid. 
Another of Vickrey 's (1963) examples is 
on pricing urban and suburban transport. He 
considered that the pricing structure in opera- 
tion in New York emphasized financing serv- 
ices rather than promoting economy in the use 
of facilities. One of his examples is on the East 
River crossings to Long Island and Brooklyn. 
In this example, the use of old bridges is free 
because of the peculiar political logic that the 
older bridges are already paid for, while tolls 
must be paid onnewer ones. As a result, traffic 
is diverted from newer facilities to the old 
bridges, such as the Manhattan and the 
Queensboro bridges, causing congestion on 
these bridges. The social opportunity cost of 
using older bridges is that users face traffic 
congestion. Vickrey suggested that tolls should 
be imposed on older bridges to reduce traffic 
congestion, and tolls should be reduced or 
removed from newer ones to encourage usage 
of these facilities. 
The concept of opportunity cost is also 
highly useful for analyzing commodities that 
have no ready market. Samuelson& 
Nordhaus (1985) provide an example. The 
drilling of oil at Yosemite National Park 
would involve considerable noise and road 
building which would spoil the park for 
hikers and bear watchers. The opportunity 
cost of oil drilling would be the presence of 
additional roads and noise. In the context of 
assets without a ready market, opportunity 
cost may not be easily measured but it has 
real value, as do barrels of oil. 
ANALYTICAL CONSTRUCTS 
In the formation of competition policy, eco- 
nomics and politics play a significant role. 
Although the perfect competition and mo- 
nopoly models are abstract and not necessar- 
ily accurate (particularly the perfect competi- 
tion model), they can be used as tools to 
provide an insight into how markets would 
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operate under such theoretical conditions. 
The theory predicts that perfectly competi- 
tive markets will result in both allocative and 
productive efficiency. Under perfect compe- 
tition, producers are ’price takers’. The price 
of the product is determined by the aggregate 
industry output and consumer demand. In 
contrast, a monopolist is a ’price maker‘. The 
monopolist exerts control over prices by set- 
ting the level of output. The monopolist has 
also the ability to create a scarcity of the 
product in order to make excess profit. Under 
monopoly, resources can be misallocated and 
as a result consumer welfare suffers. Under 
such monopolistic market conditions, a firm 
uses its dominant position to influence the 
market as illustrated, for example, by Virgin 
Atlantic’s allegations that British Airways 
has used its dominant position to Virgin’s 
detriment (Rodger & MacCulloch, 1999). But 
the problem is how to identify this ’anti- 
competitive behavior’, and the discussion 
below will identify some ways of doing this. 
ACCESS TO NETWORKS AND 
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
A network is a structure that connects comple- 
mentary compon‘mts for the purpose of pro- 
viding services demanded by consumers with- 
out the need for interconnection. Whilst an 
‘essential facility’ can be defined as one which 
is important to a firm for the purpose of pro- 
viding services to customers, but controlled 
by a rival firm. This definition is consistent 
withtheoneprovidedbyVogelsang&Mitchell 
(1997) who define an essential facility as a 
facility which is controlled by one firrn but is 
an indispensable input for the firm’s rivals. 
According to Vogelsang & Mitchell(1997), the 
market for an essential facility might not exist 
and may be impossible to define meaning- 
fully. As the owner of the facility is the only 
optimal provider, it would not be efficient to 
bypass it. From the preceding definitions, ac- 
cess to networks and ‘essential facilities’ can 
be defined as the owner of the facilities offer- 
ing the use of the facilities to rival firms for the 
purpose of providing services to customers on 
equal terms. 
Themainmotivation (for competitionau- 
thorities) for access to networks and ’essential 
facilities’ is to extend competition to upstream 
and downstream businesses that can provide 
consumers with a greater variety of services 
that are both of high quality and reasonably 
priced. Klein (1998) remarks that for some 
types of networks, for example, water pipeline 
systems, railroad tracks, gas pipelines, and 
power transmission lines, the presence of sev- 
eral parallel networks competing against each 
other would be a waste for society. The natural 
monopoly argument makes monopoly the 
most efficient market structure for providing 
access to networks. 
In the United States, refusal by the essen- 
tial facility owner to provide access to the 
facility contravenes Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act as an act of monopolization. In nurnerous 
cases, the essential facility doctrine has influ- 
enced decisions of courts (Hovenkamp, 1994). 
There are four main elements of the doctrine. 
First, a monopolist controls the essential facil- 
ity. Second, competitors cannot reasonably 
duplicate the essential facility. Third, denial of 
access is harmful to competition. Fourth, it is 
feasible for a monopolist to provide access to 
the facility. 
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However, in the United Kingdom, refusal 
by the essential facility owner is not dealt with 
under a specific Act. Where a dominant firm is 
involved, an exclusive distribution agreement 
which falls outside the Restrictive Practices 
Act 1976 is subject to a referral to the Compe- 
tition Commission under the Fair Trading Act 
1973 procedure or liable to an investigation 
under the anti-competitive practice provisions 
of the Competition Act 1980. 
Contrary to the situation in the United 
Kingdom, in the European Union, refusal by 
the essential facility owner is dealt with by 
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, which ad- 
dresses agreements in restraint of trade, and 
by Article 86, which focuses on the abuse of 
dominant position. Article lOOA of the Treaty 
of Rome is also relevant in addressing the 
issues of access to networks and 'essential 
facilities' in the telecommunications industry. 
CROSS SUBSIDY 
Viscusi et al. (1995) have provided a simple 
definition of cross subsidy. Cross subsidization 
. . . .is the use of revenue from the sale 
of one product to subsidize the sale of 
another product: More specifically, 
the price of one product is set to ex- 
ceed its average cost while the price of 
a second product is set below its aver- 
age cost (Viscusi et al., 1995, p. 337). 
There are many motives for cross 
subsidization. First, it has been used in a be- 
nevolent way by malung essential but uneco- 
nomic services affordable to all. Second, cross 
subsidy has been defended in the past by 
governments as necessary in order to finance 
development of national infrastructure (Cronin 
et al., 1995; Cronin et al., 1997). 
Kaserman et al. (1990) remarks that the 
telecommunications industry has been sub- 
jected to many varieties of cross subsidization 
via regulation. The most important in terms of 
the monetary value, according to Kaserman et 
al., is the cross subsidisation of the local service 
by the long distance service (see also Stigler, 
1971; Posner, 1971 and 1974; and Peltzman, 
1976). Stigler (1971) takes the view that busi- 
ness users who can make a sigruficant cam- 
paign contribution to regulators, and provide 
them with employment opportunities later, 
dominate regulatory decisions. According to 
Stigler, business firms that have enough politi- 
cal power will utilize the state to control entry. 
One variant is the protective tariff and 
the corresponding barriers that have been 
raised to interstate movements of goods and 
people. Other variants are using the state to 
suppress substitutes and complements, and 
to fix prices. This rent-seeking behavior by 
public officials is held to be the consequence 
of government intervention in the market 
place via public ownership or regulation. 
Rent seeking is a social cost as the resources 
used could have been used beneficially some- 
where else in the economy (Tullock, 1967), 
and is unproductive as it destroys value by 
wasting valuable resources (Buchanan, 1980). 
Posner (1975) suggests that the social costs of 
rent seeking in the regulated sector of the US 
economy could be substantial; he estimated 
that 3 percent of the US GNP was lost due to 
the social costs of monopolization through 
regulation. Krueger (1974) estimated that 7 
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percent of the GNP in India was wasted in 
rent seeking and that 15 percent of the Turkish 
GNP was lost due to rent seeking for import 
licenses. 
Posner (1971) argues that the government 
can use cross subsidization as a policy instru- 
ment to redistribute wealth from one group of 
consumers to another. Posner is of the opinion 
that cross subsidy is an aspect of public fi- 
nance that can be used to redistribute wealth. 
Laffont (1999) argues that cross subsidy can 
help finance the provision of universal service 
in developing countries. He considers that 
cross subsidy as a more efficient way of financ- 
ing these services than tax because the latter is 
more expensive. He remarks that it costs be- 
tween 0.3 and 0.5 to raise a unit of public funds 
in most developed countries. In developing 
countries, the costs are much higher, as dem- 
onstrated by Thailand (1.19 to 1.54), Malaysia 
(1.20) and Philippines (2.48). However, 
Schmalensee (1999) is more cautious in com- 
menting on the way to finance universal serv- 
ices in developing countries. Although in 
theory it is better to finance these services with 
cross subsidy in the absence of an efficient tax 
system, he argues that once the decision to rely 
on .this for financing is made, it might be 
difficult to reverse when the tax system im- 
proves. 
The third motive of cross subsidy is to 
gain 'unfair' advantages over competitors. 
Dominant firms have used cross subsidy in 
'unfair' pricing decisions. A business under- 
taking uses cross subsidy as an investment to 
minimize the impact of competition in a mar- 
ket (Heald, 1994; 1997). Moreover, the practice 
of cross subsidizing is damaging to economic 
efficiency (see for example Viscusi et al., 1995). 
-% 
There is no law on cross subsidization in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, or the 
European Union. However, under Articles 92 
and 93 in the Treaty of Rome, the cross- 
subsidization practices of an undertaking with 
an exclusive concession are viewed as state 
aid. Such practices by an undertaking will 
have to be reported to the EU Commission. In 
co-operation agreements, including joint ven- 
tures, the undertakings involved must obtain 
approval from the Commission under the 
Merger Control Regulation or Article 85(3) so 
that these businesses refrain from practicing 
cross subsidization. The reason is that they do 
not discriminate against third parties in busi- 
ness dealings because of their exclusive con- 
cession; Articles 85(d) and 86(6) set forth cer- 
tain prohibitions on third-party discrimina- 
tion. Article 86 is commonly used to condemn 
cross subsidization by an undertaking hold- 
ing an exclusive concession that confers its 
dominant position, and thereafter, reference is 
made to Article 86(a), which prohibits the 
practice of predatory pricing. 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Figure 1 shows a hypothetical airline network. 
In the figure, the airline is serving four towns 
A, B, C and D in a network with routes AB, AC, 
BC and CD. In this network setting, a passen- 
ger traveling from town A can go to any town 
without having to experience any inconven- 
iences such as changing flights. A passenger 
can travel from A to D via C or via B and C. 
Having a good network can provide competi- 
tive advantage to the airline and increase con- 
sumer demand for its services. 
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Figure 1 
A Hypothetical Airline Network 
A route can be dropped if its contribution 
is negative (the incremental revenue of the 
route is less than its IC). However, the airline 
may not dropthe route if it can increase the 
airline’s overall profits. This is because the route 
can provide network externalities, which can 
increase consumer demand for its services. 
The concept of network externalities is 
derived from the economic concept of extemal- 
ity, which is said to exist when a person extemal 
to a transaction is directly affected (positively or 
negatively) by the event of the transaction 
(Capello & Nijkamp, 1996). There are two im- 
portant characteristics of externalities in ece  
nomics (Nijkamp, 1977; Capello & Nijkamp, 
1996). The first one is interdependence, which 
refers to an interaction between decisions of 
economic agents that can be easily identified. 
The decision of an individual to join a network is 
dependent on the number of existing subscrib- 
ers. In the context of an airhe network, the 
decision is dependent on the number of already 
exkthgconnedions todestinations further afield. 
The second characteristic is that neither the indi- 
vidual who benefits has to pay nor is the indi- 
vidual who incurs the cost reimbursed. 
Table 1 illustrates an example of this con- 
cept. The airline receives an incremental rev- 
enue of €100 and incurs anexpenditure of €120 
on route CD, therefore suffers a negative con- 
tribution of €20. However, route CD has pro- 
vided network externalities to other routes. 
This is because consumers use the airline to 
travel to various destinations in the network. 
As a result, those routes gain €90 of additional 
contribution: route AB (€40); route AC (€20); 
and route BC (€30). By maintaining the route, 
the network as a whole gains an incremental 
net contribution of €70. If there are no network 
externalities associated with the route, the air- 
line will definitely drop the route. 
Table 1 
Contributions form Route CD 
I ContributionhornrouteCD I 0 I -20 I 
I Network externalities I 0 1  90 I 
The decision to keep the ’loss-malung’ route 
may give rise to claims that route CD is being 
cross subsidized by other routes, where despite 
makmg a negative ’direct’ contribution, the 
’total‘ contribution to the business is positive. 
The claims may be made on the basis that costs 
common to all routes are allocated on the Fully- 
Distributed Cost (FDC) basis. 
Economists have questioned the use of 
FDC to allocate common costs on three grounds 
that: 
(a) FDC ignores pricing efficiency, 
(b) FDC has nothingto do withcro sub- 
sidy, and 
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(c) FDC arbitrary and lacks a conceptual 
foundation (Brown & Sibley, 1986, 
p. 59). 
Economists have argued that the loss has 
nothing to do with cross subsidy which I . . .  
logically, should exist only when the deletion of 
a service benefits users of other services’ (Brown 
& Sibley, 1986, p. 49); it is merely the result of an 
arbitrary allocation of common costs. 
If the ’loss-making’ route CD is termi- 
nated, the airline may lose network externali- 
ties associated with the terminated route. For 
example, users may choose other forms of trans- 
portation or opt for its competitors’ services. If 
this happens, other routes may also be affected 
by having fewer passengers, and the airline’s 
earnings are reduced to a greater extent than if 
the ’loss-making’ route had been maintained. 
So far the discussion has not considered 
the opportunity costs of the landing slots that 
can be used for other routes or even new routes, 
which are more lucrative. The use of the slots 
for such routes can increase the airline’s profit- 
ability, particularly in the face of stiff competi- 
tion from other airlines. 
If a decision to drop the route affects the 
economic development of the area because it 
needs access to anetwork that can provide 
linkages to other networks in order to attract 
investment, the airline should not be blamed. 
By dropping the route, the airline can reallo- 
cate the resources used in a more efficient way 
since resources are scarce. If the economic 
development of the area is the government’s 
priority in its economic policy, then the gov- 
ernment should bear the costs of a politically- 
imposed policy. The government should be 
disciplined to ’. . . bear direct financial respon- 
sibility for leading corporations away from 
courses of action which their own best inter- 
ests would normally dictate; and the record of 
recoup payments would serve as a standing 
reminder of the costs of government-imposed 
policies’ (Wettenhall, 1966, p. 409). 
THE CASE 
Inverness, being the only large town in the 
Highlands of Scotland, is amajor employment 
and shopping center for the surrounding ar- 
eas. It is a regional town of strategic impor- 
tance with businesses and industry that ex- 
port €1 billion a year (excluding oil) and con- 
tributes €500 million or 20 per cent of Scot- 
land’s tourism income (Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise, 1998). Fresh perishable goods and 
live produce are air freighted out of Inverness 
via Heathrow to European capitals (High- 
lands and Islands Enterprise, 1998). 
British Airways (BA) had regular flights 
from Heathrow to Inverness after taking over 
Dan Air, which was acquired in 1991. Besides 
BA, other airlines also have regular flights to 
Inverness from various airports near London; 
Air UK flies from Stansted and EasyJet from 
Luton. With effect from November 1997, BA 
decided to stop servicing the Heathrow-h- 
verness route. Figure 2 shows local and inter- 
national routes served by BA. All routes served 
by BA are linked to either Heathrow or Gatwick 
airports. Heathrow, a London airport that is 
the largest in the world, is better linked to 
various international and domestic airports 
than Gatwick. Its large network and geographi- 
cal location attract a high volume of passen- 
gers to use the airport. 
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Figure2 
The Inverness Route 
Other local destinations 
The Highlands region needs access to a net- 
work that can provide linkages to other net- 
works in order to attract inward investment 
and tourism. Heathrow can provide the air 
links needed by Inverness. Overseas investors 
or tourists arriving at Heathrow en route to 
Inverness do not need to change airports. The 
Highland Council has argued that Heathrow 
q o r t  offers the best interlining capability in 
the United Kingdom. 
As a result of cqmpetition with other 
smaller airlines, BA, accordlng to Robert Ayling, 
its then chief executive, was losing money at the 
rate of €4 million a year on the Inverness- 
Heathrow route (the basis of calculating the 
loss was not disclosed). BA decided to switch 
its services between London and Inverness from 
Heathrow to Gatwick, and franchised the serv- 
ices to British Regional Airlines (BRA) (Envi- 
ronment Transport and Regional Affairs Com- 
mittee, 1998). The switch from Heathrow to 
Gatwick, according to Robert Ayling, was be- 
cause BA's short-haul services at Heathrow op- 
erating into Continental Europe faced stiff com- 
petition from European competitors. The three 
slots that had been used for the Inverness route 
were subsequently used for the Stuttgart, Berlin 
and Venice routes. David Stewart, the Labour 
M P  for Inverness East, Nairn and Lochaber, and 
a member of the Scottish Affairs Committee, 
claimed that the Inverness slots were sacrificed 
in favor of more lucrative international markets 
(Scottish Affairscommittee, 1997). DavidStewart 
criticized BA's decision and argued that slots at 
Heathrow should not be totally subjected to free- 
market forces, e s p e d y  where they provide 
services to remote areas of the country with 
fragile economies. Iain Robertson, the chief ex- 
ecutive of Highlands and Islands Enterprise 
(HIE), said that BA's decision 'posed a serious 
threat to the economic revival of the Highlands' 
(Buxton, 1997, p. 8). 
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A franchise is a contractual license under 
which BRA is permitted to carry on the Inver- 
ness services under BA’s trade name, and BA 
provides continuing advice and assistance to 
BRA. Franchising is a means to reduce costs 
and staffing levels. On one hand, BA can avoid 
the high costs of providing the services through 
franchising the route to BRA. On the other 
hand, franchising can lead to a reduction in the 
quality of services; David Stewart raised the 
issue of service quality when he said that BA 
could not guarantee the frequency of flights 
and the fare structure. BA’s decision to fran- 
chise the route to BRA had not received the 
support of the people of the Highlands and 
Islands. 
The move from Heathrow to Gatwick is 
said to have affected the economic develop- 
ment of the area because Heathrow is ‘a very 
strong card’ for attracting inward investment 
(Environment Transport and Regional Affairs 
Committee, 1998). According to a study by 
HIE, passengers in 1996 interlining via 
Heathrow from Inverness went to 46 differ- 
ent destinations, of which 19 were not served 
by Gatwick (Scottish Affairs Committee, 
1997). Business passengers seeking to travel 
tocentral and west London boroughs (City of 
Westminster, City of London, Kensington and 
Chelsea, Camden, Lambeth and Tower Ham- 
lets), or to counties west of London, preferred 
to use Heathrow airport (Highland Council, 
1998). In addition, American and Japanese 
companies are located around Heathrow. 
Gatwick, according to Highlands and Is- 
lands Enterprise (1998), is a second-best alter- 
native to Heathrow, as demonstrated by the 
fall in monthly traffic on the new Inverness- 
Gatwick route as compared to the old Inver- 
\ 
ness-Heathrow route, and does not provide 
the same connecting opportunities as 
Heathrow and ’... interlining passengers are 
inconvenienced by the extra time and cost in 
transferring to and from Heathrow’ (Environ- 
ment Transport and Regional Affairs Com- 
mittee (Transport Sub-Committee), 1998a, para 
292), whereas Heathrow is the preferred air- 
port for a majority of passengers travelling 
from the rest of the world to the British region 
(Highland Council, 1998). 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE 
People with vested interests in the case, such 
as Iain Robertson, have made various claims. 
BA’s decision to use the slots for international 
destinations demonstrates that there are op- 
portunity costs of using the slots, which can be 
used for the routes that give the highest contri- 
bution to profits. Robert Ayling stated: 
If we had an 8 o’clock slot which was 
being used for one route which was a 
profitable route, but there was a very 
strong customer demand for that 8 
o’clock slot to be used for another 
slot, then we might swap the slots 
(Environment Transport and Re- 
gional Affairs Committee (Transport 
Sub-Committee), 1998b, para 530). 
BA again emphasized the opportunity 
costs of the slots when Robert Ayling argued 
that, if a route is less profitable than an alter- 
native for a reasonable period of time, the 
route willbe withdrawn. In terms of allocative 
efficiency, it seems that BA is optimizing the 
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use of scarce resources. In a situation where 
competitive pressure is high, as is the cost of 
the service, BA is moving ’. . . along a produc- 
tion surface towards greater allocative effi- 
ciency’ (Leibenstein 1966, p. 413). This is sup- 
ported by the fact that the network externali- 
ties derived from the Inverness-Heathrow 
route were not sufficient to resist the removal 
of the landing slots to other more lucrative 
routes. Leibenstein (1966) reported on a visit 
by Frederick Harbison to two petroleum refin- 
eries in Egypt less than one and a half mile 
apart. The labor productivity of one refinery 
had been significantly less than the other for 
many years. However, after a change of man- 
agement, the inefficient refinery was able to 
significantly increase its labor productivity. 
Leibenstein (1966) concluded that the change 
did not take place earlier because there was 
insufficient motivation to do so. Similarly, BA 
had insufficient motivation to remove the slots 
from Inverness-Heathrow route because there 
was no pressure on its profitability. However, 
BA has now been out-maneuvered by smaller 
airlines, and falling passenger numbers have 
forced it to overhaul its strategy. 
To face an increasingly competitive mar- 
ket, BA has to use its scarce resources effi- 
ciently. BA’s argument, to use the slots for 
additional flights on those international routes 
to remain competitive, supports this reasoning: 
\ 
Competitors on those routes have 
better schedules and we were com- 
petitively disadvantaged because we 
could not maintain the competitive 
arrangements that we wanted to 
(Scottish Affairs Committee, 1997, 
para 8). 
As the Incremental Cost (IC) of servicing 
the Inverness route is greater than its revenue, 
there is substance to the claim that the route has 
been cross subsidized by other routes. Moreo- 
ver, if a figure can be calculated to place a value 
on the opportunity cost of the slots, the size of 
the cross subsidy to the Inverness route could 
be much higher than what has been claimed. 
It can be inferred that BA’s decision was 
made after considering its own economic wel- 
fare. Based on the concept of opportunity cost, 
BA’s decision in withdrawing the slots used to 
service the Inverness-Heathrow route was eco- 
nomically rational. BA should not be forced to 
provide the service particularly when the in- 
dustry is highly competitive. This is because 
slots are in short supply and the opportunity 
costs of using slots for short-haul flights are 
high. It seems that BA’s management account- 
ing information system has not been able to 
give the value of the opportunity costs of those 
assets. The inference is made based on various 
conflicting statements made by BA’s senior 
officers about losses suffered by BA. David 
Noyes, the BA Director for United Kingdom, 
Africa and the Middle East, stated that the 
Inverness-Heathrow route had lost over €2.5 
million in 1996. BA was reported by Buxton 
(1997) to have lost €8 million on the Heathrow- 
Inverness route since 1992. This may be the 
reason for the difficulty in determining the 
opportunity cost of the slots and also the avoid- 
able costs of the Inverness-Heathrow route. 
As a result, it is difficult to discover which 
route is not profitable after an opportunity 
cost charge for the slot, and therefore needs to 
be eliminated. 
BA‘s decision may affect the economic 
development of Inverness and its surround- 
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ing areas. However, the economic develop- 
ment of the areas is not the responsibility of 
BA. If the economic development of Inverness 
and its surrounding areas is the government’s 
priority in its economic policy, then the gov- 
ernment should bear those costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Analytical constructs and concepts of costs 
can establish relevant facts and costs that give 
insights into anti-competitive behavioral is- 
sues in competition policy. However, in the 
case of cross subsidy, it is difficult to identify, 
measure and develop public policy response. 
Bos (1994, p. 139) argued that no public policy 
response may be necessary: 
. . . the problem of cross-subsidization 
is of no importance from the point of 
view of welfare economics. If optimal 
pricing includes any kind of cross- 
subsidization (of the Faulhaber type or 
of an extended type), then that cross- 
subsidization should be accepted. 
To conclude, management accountants 
can help competiion authorities expose anti- 
competitive behavior and clarrfy certain com- 
petitive issues such as access to networks and 
essential facilities and cross subsidy. Thus, 
there is a role for management accountants to 
play in competition policy debates, and the 
competition policy field is an important area 
for accounting research. In addition, the 
insights derived from the real-world example 
discussed in this article have a relevance to 
other competition policy issues. 
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